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This paper reconsiders the optimal taxation of money and other financial assets. The
optimal tax formulae reflect that money provides liquidity services and is a saving vehicle.
In fact, it is useful to reformulate the optimal tax problem to allow for separate taxes on the
liquidity and saving functions of money. This reformulation allows one to better understand
the original optimal tax problem. The possible optimality of a subsidy on borrowing, for
instance, can be explained if it is noted that the theoretically correct measure of savings
reflects that money as well as nonmonetary assets can serve as saving vehicles.
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1. Introduction
In a classic paper, Friedman (1969) argues that an efficient monetary policy requires
that nominal interest rates are set to zero so that the liquidity services provided by money are
effectively not taxed. Phelps (1973) instead argues that if only distorting taxes are available,
then the liquidity services of money should also be taxed. A considerable literature, including
Kimbrough (1986), Faig (1988), Woodford (1990), Guidotti and Végh (1993) and Chari,
Christiano and Kehoe (1996), has investigated under what conditions the Friedman rule
continues to hold despite the government’s need to raise positive revenue with distorting
taxes. These conditions relate to how exactly money is modeled and to the set of available
tax instruments. In practice, however, most countries maintain positive nominal interest rates
and thus effectively tax money holdings.
Money demand is intricately related to the demand for other financial assets such as
bank deposits. It is therefore natural to consider the joint taxation of money and deposits,
where deposits can be taxed directly or by way of reserve requirements. Seigniorage in
conjunction with other implicit or explicit financial taxation is considered by Fry (1981),
Siegel (1981), Mourmouras and Russell (1992), Romer (1985), Brock (1989) and Bacchetta
and Caminal (1992). This paper extends the analysis of the joint taxation of money and other
financial assets. Taking the view that money economizes on shopping costs, this paper
explicitly solves for the optimal taxes rates on money and other financial assets. The optimal
tax formulae imply that negative holdings of nonmonetary assets, or private sector borrowing,
may optimally be subsidized, if money holdings are taxed at a positive rate. At the same time,
the money tax may optimally be negative, although generally the tax-inclusive return on
money exceeds the tax-inclusive return on other assets.
To understand these results, one has to realize that a tax on money is a joint tax on the
liquidity services provided by money and on saving. The tax on nonmonetary assets instead
is a straight tax on saving. As noted by Chari, Christiano, Kehoe (1996) and others, a
monetary economy can be seen to be equivalent to a ’real’ economy, where the liquidity
services provided by money are taken to be a separate real good. Along these lines, this paper
restates the government’s optimal tax problem for the case where the liquidity and saving
functions of money are taken to be separate variables. This reformulated optimal tax problem2
yields straightforward results: the liquidity services provided by money should be taxed at a
positive rate, and saving, whether positive or negative, should also effectively be taxed.
Again, consider the result mentioned above that the government may optimally
subsidize borrowing, or negative holdings of nonmonetary assets, in the original monetary
model. A correct measure of saving includes the saving implicit in money holdings as well
as in other assets and thus is larger than the (negative) saving through nonmonetary assets.
The corrected measure of saving, thus, may be positive, even if the actual accumulation of
nonmonetary assets is negative (i.e. there is borrowing). Thus what looks like a subsidy on
borrowing actually may be a positive tax on the theoretically correct measure of saving.
Intuitively, the government may wish to subsidize borrowing in order to enable the private
sector to hold additional money balances subject to the money tax. A negative tax on money
may similarly be explained by the substitutability of money and nonmonetary assets as stores
of value.
The taxation of money (seigniorage) and of nonmonetary assets (financial repression)
are particularly important in developing countries (see Giovannini and de Melo (1993)).
Effective subsidies on government and private sector borrowing by way of low real interest
rates tend to coexist with a substantial taxation of money by way of inflation. The
interrelationship between taxes on money and other financial assets thus is of particular, but
not exclusive, interest for the developing countries. Huizinga (1996) provides some further
evidence that some countries have used their systems of two-tiered exchange rates, with
separate commercial and financial exchange rates, to effectively subsidize capital inflows, or
national borrowing, from abroad. Specifically, the Dominican Republic (in the early 1980s)
and South Africa (in the early 1990s) are estimated to have subsidized capital inflows a cost
of about one percent of GNP per year. The theoretical analysis in this paper is framed in
terms of stylized taxes on money and other financial assets, with direct applications for bank
regulation in the form of reserve requirements, capital income taxation and exchange rate
policy.1
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model
and examines the joint taxation of money and other financial instruments in the monetary
model where money provides liquidity services and is a saving vehicle. Section 3 examines3
the equivalent optimal tax problem in the real economy where money only provides liquidity
services. Section 4 examines the open economy and, in particular, current account
implications of the model, if taxes on nonmonetary assets take the form of border taxes which
can be called capital controls. Section 5 concludes.
2. Taxation in the monetary model
Consider a small open economy populated by overlapping generations with a life span
of two periods so that at each moment two generations are alive. Throughout, the subscripts
1 and 2 refer to the currently alive young and old. Any agent of age i receives an endowment
income, yi, in a particular period. When young, agents consume and accumulate real money
balances, m1, and other assets, b1, called bonds. When old, agents rid themselves of their
previously accumulated asset holdings and again consume. Following Adams and Greenwood
(1985) and others, money provides liquidity services. In particular, let a share v1(m1/y1) of
the young’s endowment income, y1, be absorbed in transactions so that the young’s net-of-













0<v 1 (0) < 1, v1 (0) ³ 1,
v1 <0 , v 1 >0 i f m 1<m ,
(1) v1 0, v1 0i fm 1 ³ m ,
This formulation reflects that there are diminishing returns to holding real money
balances up a satiation level, .2 The assumption of implies that the m v1 (0) ³ 1
accumulation of first period money balances reduces the resources available for first period
consumption and bond accumulation, i.e. it reduces c1 +b 1 .
Let i* be the constant international real interest rate. The young are assumed to obtain
real returns of 1 +i *-t mand 1 +i *-t bon their money and bond holdings respectively,
where tm and tb are the implicit or explicit tax rates on money and bond holdings reflecting4
the rate of inflation, income and wealth taxes and perhaps other measures. Note that with tb
>0 , negative bond holdings, or rather private sector borrowings, are subsidized. The
government is assumed to have to raise revenues, , each period starting with the period ˆ R >0
in which the primordial generation reaches old age. These tax revenues can be thought to be
spent on a stream of public goods, , again starting in the period in which the first ˆ R >0
generation reaches old age. These assumptions are reflected in the following steady state
government resource constraint,
(2) tm m1 tb b1 ³ ˆ R
Let ci be the agent’s consumption at age i. The agent’s budget constraints when young
and old are stated as follows,
c1 =( 1-v 1 )y1 - m1 - b1 (3.1)
c2 =y 2+( 1+i *-t m )m1 +( 1+i *-t b )b1 (3.2)
Absent any pre-existing government debts, the country’s invariant net foreign asset
position, n, is equal to m1 +b 1 , and the current account in each period is in balance.
A young agent chooses his money and bond holdings so as to maximize a standard
lifetime concave utility function U(c1, c2). The optimality conditions regarding the choices




U1 =( 1+i *-t b )U2 (4.2)
From eq. (4.1), we see that money demand, m1, is independent of preferences. This
reflects that money balances are chosen so as to maximize the present value of resources
available for consumption using the tax-inclusive interest rate on bonds as the discount rate.5
Assuming for now that there are positive money balances with tm > tb (which below is
shown to be implied by the optimal tax system), we can check from eq. (1) and (4.1) that
money balances, m1, are negatively (positively) related to the money (bond) tax tm (tb), while
(3.1)-(4.2) imply that bond holdings, b1, are positively related to the money tax, tm, but
related in an ambiguous way to the bond tax, tb. Next, consumption in either period is
negatively related to the tax on money, tm, while consumption when young (old) is
ambiguously (negatively) related to the bond tax, tb. These relationships reflect that either
financial tax affects the agent’s consumption-saving decision as well as his portfolio choice.
The various dependencies of asset holdings and consumption at the two stages of life on the
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money demand with respect to the money tax, tm; where p2 is the propensity to consume








compensated derivative of first period consumption, c1, with respect to the bond tax, tb,
divided by b1. The definition of p2 can be seen to imply that p1 =( 1+i *-t b )p is the
propensity to consume in the first period out of net-of-transaction-cost first period income.
Further, note that is the compensated semi-elasticity of saving with respect to the bond s
tax tb in the absence of money, as then savings equal b1 = (1 - v(0))y1 - c1.
Figure (1) illustrates how money and bond holdings, m1 and b1, depend on the set of
financial taxes, tm and tb. First, note that with tb > tm the young optimally accumulate
infinite money holdings financed through infinite borrowing. Next, with tb = tm the agent6
is indifferent between accumulating any level of money holdings equal to or exceeding the
satiation level, , while bond holdings, b1, can be of either sign or zero. In the figure, we m
draw the case where with b1 is negative with tb = tm. In the figure, we further assume that
b1 is negative, if tm is slightly above tb. Next, different combinations of the tax rates tm
and tb consistent with zero bond holdings, i.e. b1 = 0, (and money holdings below the
satiation point) are represented by an upward sloping locus, as db1/dtb <0and db1/dtm >
0 with b1 = 0.3 Note that the position of this locus reflects that tm > tb with b1 =0 .
Clearly, above (below) the b1 =0locus we have negative (positive) bond holdings, b1.
Again, negative bond holdings imply that the agent is on net borrowing at a tax-inclusive
real interest rate i* - tb.
The government faces the problem of choosing the financial tax rates, tm and tb,s o
as to maximize the (constant) lifetime utility of any generation subject to its minimum
revenue constraint in (2).4 The government’s maximization problem can be stated formally
as follows,
Max U(c1,y 2+( 1+i *-t m )m1 +( 1+i *-t b )b1)
+ l(tmm1 + tbb1 -) (5) ˆ R
where l is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the minimum revenue requirement (2).
The optimality conditions associated with (5) with respect to the money and bond tax

































Using eq. (2) and (6.1)-(6.2), we can solve for the optimal money and bond tax rates,














[b1 (v1 1)m 1]e m
Clearly, the sign of the expression for and thus of the optimal financial tax rates, q
tm and tb, in (7.1) and (7.2) depends crucially on the theoretically ambiguous sign of the
expression b1 +( v 1 ’+1 )m1. To interpret this latter expression, we next analyze the
government’s optimal tax problem in a reformulated real model where the liquidity services
provided by money are taken to be an independent good that can be taxed separately. In this
real economy, the government thus can impose separate taxes on the liquidity and saving
functions of money. As shown below, the expression of b1 +( v 1 ’+1 )m1 then equals first
period savings.
3. Taxation in the real model
In the model above, both money and bonds are saving vehicles, while bonds are the
marginal saving vehicle is response to, say, a change in second period endowment income,
y2. Put differently, the optimal bond holdings, b1, reflect that money also serves as a store
of value. To obtain an money-inclusive concept of first period saving, let the young’s
savings, s1, implicitly be defined as follows,
(8) c2 y2 (1 i tb)s1
Eq. (8) makes clear that savings, s1, are defined such that they increase second period
consumption, c2, beyond the second period endowment, y2. Using (3.2) and (8), we can





Eq. (9) implies that s1 > b1,a ss 1is equal to actual bond holdings, b1, plus any
implicit bond-equivalent savings implicit in first period money holdings (this is the last term
in (9)). Applying (4.1) and (9), we see that s1 = b1 +( v 1 ’+1 )m1.
In this section, we consider the government’s optimal tax problem where the
government imposes separate taxes on the liquidity services provided by money and on
savings. To this end, let money, m1, as before, provide liquidity services as reflected in (1),
but let us rid money of its store of value function. Specifically, let us assume that the young
at the end of period 1 redeem their money holdings (net of any taxes paid on money
holdings in the first period) for bond holdings one-for-one. The resulting level of bond
holdings at the end of the first period of life then equals the level of savings, s1. The
government now needs to raise revenues, , by distorting money and saving taxation. ˆ R
Therefore, the government levies a tax tm on money holdings, m1, in each generation’s first




generation’s second period of life. Analogously to (2), the generations-specific government
budget constraint is written as,
(10) tm(1 i )m1 tbs1 ³ ˆ R
The tax rate and tax base definitions across the monetary and real models imply
and tb = tb. Solving for tm,w eg e t t m ( t m t b )/(1 i tb) tm tm(1 i )
This expression clearly indicates that tm is a dual tax on the liquidity and tb (1 tm).
saving functions of money. Specifically, note that the money tax, tm, approaches the sum
tm( 1+i * )+t bof the effective taxes on the liquidity and saving functions of money for
small values of tm.
Instead of (4.1)-(4.2), private sector money and savings in the real economy are
guided by the optimality conditions and . v1 tm U1 (1 i tb)U2
Analogously to (7.1)-(7.2), we now obtain the following optimal financial tax rate
expressions,9
(11.1) t m (1 i )
ˆ es ˆ R




m1 ˆ es s1 ˆ em
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< 0
where is the (compensated) semi-elasticity of savings, s1, with respect ˆ es [dc1/tb]c/s1














the semi-elasticity of money, m1, with respect to the tax tm divided by 1-i *-t b . 5The
positive sign of tm in (11.1) indicates that the liquidity services provided by money are to
be taxed at a positive rate. From (11.2), we further see that the saving tax, tb, has the same
sign as savings, s1, which in essence means that savings should be taxed, regardless of
whether they are positive or negative (unless they are just equal to zero, in which case only
the money tax, tm, is used). As tb = tb, expressions (7.2) and (11.2) are fully equivalent.
An interesting scenario occurs when savings, s1, are positive, but bond holdings, b1,
are negative. Following (9), this is possible as money holdings, m1, are optimally positive.
With s1 >0 , the bond tax, tb = tb, is optimally positive so savings are taxed. The negative
bond holdings b1, however, imply that the private sector is effectively borrowing in the first
period. Borrowing at a relatively low tax-inclusive rate of return, 1+i *-t b , means that
such borrowing is subsidized. Subsidized borrowing, b1, thus can coexist with positive
savings, s1, that are taxed at a positive rate. Intuitively, the purpose of subsidized borrowing
is to enable private agents to hold additional money balances subject to the money tax. In
practice, this scenario is implemented if the authorities engineer low tax-inclusive real
interest rates (by whatever means) in an inflationary environment.
To conclude this section, let us consider the sign of the optimal money tax, tm. Note
that the optimal tax formulae (11.1) and (11.2) for tm and tb = tb together imply the optimal
tax formula (7.1) for tm given the relationship . With tm tm tm (1 i ) t b(1 tm)
in (11.2) always positive, it is easily seen that tm is positive with (implying s1 ³ 0
). Second, tm can be of either sign or zero with (implying ). Of tb ³ 0 s1 <0 t b<0
interest is the case where tm <0so that money holdings are effectively subsidized as is
possible with s1 <0 . In this instance, money holdings are subsidized, as increased money
holdings induce agents to increased their (taxed) first period dissaving or borrowing.10
4. Implications for the country’s net foreign asset position
In this section, we consider the implications of the optimal taxation in either
formulation of the model for the country’s net foreign asset position. To start, let us assume
that the government has no pre-existing debts or assets. From (3.1), it is clear that national
savings, n, at the time the first generation enters the world is given by m1 +b 1 . These
national savings also equal the country’s net foreign asset position. Note that national
savings, n, exceed private savings, s1,a sn=b 1+m 1>s 1=b 1+(v1’ + 1)m1 with tm >
tb. The reason is that the private sector saves out of first period income net of the tax, tm,
on liquidity services, while the government is assumed to spend all tax revenues extracted
from a generation in that generation’s old age on, say, social security. As an implication,
a positive net foreign asset position, i.e. n>0 , can be consistent with private saving, s1,
being positive, zero, or negative, and therefore the saving tax, tb = tb, being positive, zero
or negative. To illustrate, let us assume that the financial tax, tb, is implemented as a border
tax.6 Capital exports with n>0can then be taxed or subsidized (or neither). The
possibility of capital exports that are subsidized, which is somewhat puzzling, stems from
the assumption on the timing of government spending (see below). Next, n=0implies that
s1 <0and therefore tb < 0. This means that in the absence of any capital flows the
government imposes a just prohibitive capital export subsidy (or capital import tax). Finally,
n<0implies s1 <0and therefore tb <0 . Capital inflows thus are accompanied by a
capital import tax.
To sort out the role of the timing assumption regarding government spending, we can
assume alternatively that the government spends all tax revenues from a generation during
the generation’s youth on, say, education. In particular, let us assume that the government
spends on some public good during each generation’s youth. It is then ˆ R /(1 i )
straightforward to show that national savings, , and private n m1 b1 ˆ R /(1 i )
savings, s1, have the same sign. In this instance, either a capital inflow (coincident with
private dissaving) or a capital outflow (coincident with private saving) are to be taxed.
To conclude this section, let us assume that the government spends part of its
resources on debt service. In particular, let us assume that the government has a steady state
debt, d, so that it spends i*d on debt service each period, which implies that resources11
are available for non-debt related spending. The country’s net foreign asset ˆ R i d
position now equals n=m 1+b 1-d[ - ], if government revenues are spent ˆ R/(1 i )
during each generation’s old age [ youth ]. An interesting point, perhaps, is that the optimal
domestic tax-inclusive financial returns are related to the overall government revenue
requirement, , but not to the share of these revenues that is spent on debt service. In other ˆ R
words, the optimal financial taxes depends on how much resources the government needs,
and not on how these resources are spent. If optimal financial taxes do not depend on d,
then they also do not depend on the size (and sign) of n for a given value of required
government revenues . ˆ R
Note that eq. (10) indicates that government revenues from the taxation of
nonmonetary assets or financial repression are given by . These revenues are non- tb s1
negative, as tb and s1 optimally have the same sign. Recently, Giovannini and de Melo
(1993) have presented empirical evidence on the magnitude of financial repression for a set
of developing countries. Their measure of government revenues from financial repression
is the government debt service savings on domestically held government debt resulting from
the fact that the domestic interest rate is lower than the international interest rate on
comparable debts. Note that Giovannini and de Melo’s measure of revenues from financial
repression is zero if the government does not have any domestically held debt, although
is generally positive. This discussion suggests that a comprehensive measure of tb s1
financial repression hinges on a correct measure of saving (or dissaving) and the taxes
applied to this measure.
5. Conclusion
This paper has examined the joint taxation of money and nonmonetary assets. The
optimal tax scheme reflects the dual role of money as a means of payment and a store of
value. This paper shows that the authorities may optimally wish to subsidize domestic
borrowing, as such borrowing enables agents to accumulate additional money balances12
subject to the money tax. If a country is a capital importer, the subsidized borrowing can
manifest itself as a capital import subsidy.
The present paper assumes that money requires liquidity services. As these liquidity
services enhance consumption possibilities they are essentially a productive factor.
Alternatively, money can be chosen to yield direct utility. In this instance, the money tax
effectively is joint tax on money as a consumption good and money as a store of value. In
this instance, it may also be beneficial to introduce separate taxes on money as a consump-
tion good as a saving vehicle to better understand the optimal taxation of money.13
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Endnotes
1. Also note that the analysis of this paper can be applied to the profit maximizing
problem of, say, a commercial bank that offers its customers a money-like liability,
in the form of current accounts, and a nonmonetary liability, in the form of saving
accounts.
2. The assumption that there is a satiation level of money balances is immaterial.
3. Here we assume that the b1 =0locus indeed exists.
4. The government can be seen as a social planner that maximizes the present dis-
counting value of all private utilities at the international interest rate giving rise to
tax smoothing.
5. With equivalent tax-inclusive returns across the two models, we have
and . ˆ es
b1
s1
es ˆ em em
6. Note that a border tax on international capital income is equivalent to a residence-
based saving or capital income tax in the absence of physical capital investments.